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TAX TRAPS IN SPLIT-DOLLAR LIFE INSURANCE
— by Neil E. Harl*
Split-dollar life insurance has become a popular
insurance arrangement in recent years.1  Under a split-dollar
policy, an employer and an employee agree to share the
costs and benefits of a permanent life insurance contract
providing both a death benefit and cash value. The
employer provides the funds to pay part of the annual
premium to the extent of the increase in the cash surrender
value each year; the employee pays the balance of the
annual premium.  The employer is typically entitled to
receive, out of the proceeds of the policy, an amount equal
to the cash surrender value or at least the amount of the
premiums paid.  The employee has the right to name the
beneficiary of the balance of proceeds payable at death.
As a practical matter, the employee pays a substantial
part of the premiums in the early years of the policy but the
employee’s share of the premium decreases rapidly and
often reaches zero after a few years.
An employee is taxable on the value of the cost of the
insurance protection benefit provided to the employee under
the arrangement.2  The benefit is defined by using the
tabular P.S. No. 58 term rate or the insurer’s one-year term
rates available for all standard risks.3  That amount equals
the one-year term cost of the declining life insurance
protection to which the employee is entitled from year to
year, less the portion provided by the employee, if any.4
The Internal Revenue Service has determined that a split-
dollar insurance arrangement should not be treated as an
interest-free loan by the employer to the employee.5
Originally, IRS had determined that these arrangements
could be treated as interest-free loans.6  However, IRS later
concluded that position was incorrect.7
Worrisome 1995 ruling
In a 1995 technical advice memorandum, IRS
determined that an employee has reportable income “...to
the extent that the cash surrender values of the policies
exceed the premiums paid ...” by the employer.8  The
position of the Service was that the income was properly
reportable under I.R.C. § 83.9  The employee must include
in income each year the arrangement is in force — (1) an
amount equal to the one-year term cost of declining life
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insurance and (2) any cash surrender buildup in the policies
exceeding the amount returnable to the employer when the
arrangement is discontinued.10  Under the facts of the 1995
ruling, the policies were owned by a trust and the employee
was considered to have made a gift to the trust each year
equal to the amount included in the employee’s income
each year under the split-dollar arrangement.11
Critique of the 1995 ruling
The storm of protest over the issuance of the 1995 ruling
has focused principally upon the fact that earlier revenue
rulings had not provided a basis for taxing, and did not
contemplate taxing, employees on the cash surrender values
in split-dollar contracts in excess of the employer’s
premium payments.12  Also, objection has been voiced on
the grounds that I.R.C. § 83 only applies where substantial
vesting has occurred.  However, the ruling recites that “the
cost of life insurance protection under a life insurance
contract is taxable generally under section 61 of the Code
during the period the contract remains substantially
nonvested.”13
Under the statute, I.R.C. § 83, if property is transferred
in connection with the performance of services to any
person other than the person for whom the services were
performed, the excess of the fair market value of the
property over the amount paid for the property is included
in the service provider’s gross income in the first taxable
year in which the rights of the service provider in the
property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture.14  The ruling points out that, under the
regulations, the term “property” for purposes of I.R.C. § 83
includes a beneficial interest in assets (including money)
which is transferred or set aside from the claims of creditors
of the transferor such as in a trust or escrow account.15
In the 1995 ruling, while the employer had a collateral
security interest in the policies to assure repayment of the
employer’s premium payments, there had arguably not been
a transfer of beneficial ownership in the property from the
employer to the employee within the meaning of I.R.C. §
83.
Planning suggestions
Although there remains the possibility that the Internal
Revenue Service may reconsider the position taken in the
1995 ruling,16 it seems prudent to review split-dollar
arrangements that have progressed to the point of producing
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tax consequences under the 1995 ruling.  Specifically, it
may be wise to consider slowing the increase in cash value
so that it accrues over a longer term.  That postpones equity
attainment.  Also, it may be possible to avoid a taxable
transfer under I.R.C. § 83 by providing for a substantial risk
of forfeiture on the part of the employee.  A taxable transfer
does not occur if the interest has not vested.17  Vesting
could be tied to attainment of performance objectives by the
employee (or reaching a specified number of years’
service).
In conclusion...
The last word has clearly not been written on the tax
treatment of split-dollar life insurance contracts.  Further
guidance from the Internal Revenue Service is to be
expected.  Moreover, the Service position is likely to be
challenged in court.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was a contestant in a horse
show and had ridden her horse up to the arena entrance but
was prevented from entering by a mass of people. The
defendant was also an entrant and had stopped nearby for
the same reason. A horse exiting the arena was forced to
walk close to the defendant’s horse and bumped the
defendant’s horse, causing it to rear and kick the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued for damages under negligence and strict
liability theories. The defendant argued that La. Rev. Stat. §
9:2795.1 provided immunity from the suit. The statute
provided immunity from liability for an “equine activity
sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person.” The
court held that the defendant was within the class of
persons provided with immunity from liability. The
plaintiff argued that the exception in the statute for willful
or wanton disregard for the safety of others applied because
the defendant should have known that the defendant’s horse
would kick if bumped. The defendant testified that the
horse had not kicked anyone before but that it was common
knowledge that horses could become frightened if their
“comfort zone” was invaded. The court held that the
incident was within the range of dangers associated with
equine activities and held that the defendant did not commit
willful or wanton disregard for the plaintiff’s safety.
Gautreau v. Washington, 672 So.2d 262 (La. Ct. App.
1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned 78 acres of rural
land. The debtors’ home was situated on 2 acres, 76 acres
were contiguous woodlands, and 3.5 acres of the woodland
were used as a residence by the debtors’ adult daughter and
her children. The home site and woodlands were assessed
together for property taxes but the 3.5 acres were assessed
separately. The 3.5 acres were not included as security for a
loan used to buy the entire 78 acres. The court held that the
debtors were entitled to a rural homestead exemption for
their home site and the woodlands but not for the 3.5 acres
used as a residence by the daughter. The court noted that
the woodlands qualified as rural property even though the
debtors did not use the land for agricultural purposes,
because the land was clearly rural in nature and the state
exemption statute did not require that a rural homestead
property be actively used for farming or other agricultural
purposes.  In re McCall, 195 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1995).
PRIORITY. During the debtor’s Chapter 12 case, the
county assessed property taxes against the debtor’s
property. The debtor converted the case to Chapter 7. The
county sought seventh priority status for the tax claim
under Section 507(a)(7). The court held that when the taxes
were assessed a lien was automatically created by Ark.
Code § 26-34-101 and the taxes became a secured claim.
The court held that Section 507(a)(7) allowed a priority
only for unsecured governmental claims; therefore, the
county’s claim would have to be paid from its security and
could not receive priority. In re Wrigley, 195 B.R. 914
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
VALUATION. The issue in this case was the valuation
of the debtors’ farm real and personal property to determine
the amount of the FmHA (now FSA) secured claim in the
property. The court discredited both the FmHA in-house
appraisal and the debtor’s personal appraisal of the property
